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Abstract
The Delaware Chancery’s new-found willingness to hold corporate directors
accountable for breaching the duty of good faith has provoked widespread at-
tention in both the business and legal communities. Legal practitioners and
scholars recognize the novelty of Delaware’s recent good faith jurisprudence, as
well as its potential to expose directors to gigantic personal damage awards,
and in fact have published numerous articles that seek to delimit the bound-
aries of good faith conduct. But until now, most discussions of good faith as a
fiduciary duty have approached the subject as an abstract measure of conduct,
showing little regard for how a complaint alleging bad faith would fare in an
actual Delaware case.
This article adopts a unique approach to good faith by viewing the subject
from a litigation-based perspective. With an eye toward the practical effects of
fiduciary duty jurisprudence, the paper follows the path of a shareholder law-
suit from injury to judgment, noting where good faith has combined with other
state and federal developments to change the fortunes of plaintiff shareholders
and defendant directors. I conclude that recent good faith jurisprudence has
all but eliminated the possibility of dismissing many fiduciary duty suits on the
pleadings, and has substantially reduced a defendant’s chances of prevailing at
trial.
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1INTRODUCTION
Delaware corporate law, and American corporate law by extension,1 has long been 
shaped by “the most scrupulous…duty” of officers and directors to “affirmatively…protect the 
interests of the corporation” and “to refrain from doing anything that would work injury to” it.2
Traditionally, this duty has been distilled by courts into the twin fiduciary obligations of care and 
loyalty.3  The duty of care compels directors “to act on an informed basis” when exercising their 
power to manage the corporation’s affairs.4  In turn, the duty of loyalty demands “that the best 
interest of the corporation and its shareholders take[] precedence over any interest possessed by a 
director, officer or controlling shareholder and not shared by the stockholders generally.”5
Although the Supreme Court of Delaware has described both duties as “equal and 
independent,”6 the duty of care has occupied a back seat in Delaware shareholder derivative  
lawsuits since the legislature allowed corporations to exculpate their directors from liability for 
most fiduciary duty violations that do not involve disloyalty or bad faith.7  Until recently, Section 
102(b)(7) and other aspects of Delaware corporate law effectively shielded all but the most 
obviously culpable managers and directors from liability or trial.8
* Associate, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher L.L.P. (Not admitted to practice).  J.D., Duke University School of Law. This 
paper was presented to the Student Scholarship Workshop at Duke Law School and benefited from the participants’ 
helpful suggestions.  Many thanks to George C. Christie, Steven Shoemate, and Thomas J. Allingham II for their 
advice and comments on earlier drafts.  The author would especially like to thank Deborah A. Demott for her 
guidance throughout the course of this project.  All errors are the author’s alone.
1
 Delaware has long dominated the field of corporate law in the United States by virtue of its near monopoly on out-
of-state incorporations.  Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 29 J. 
CORP. L. 625, 632 (2004); see also Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 457 (2004) 
(dubbing Delaware “the mother of all corporate law”).
2
 Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
3
 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993) (describing care and loyalty as the “traditional 
hallmarks of a fiduciary who endeavors to act in the service of a corporation and its stockholders”).
4 Id. at 367.
5 Id. at 361.
6 Id.
7 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §102(b)(7) (2001) (available in full in Appendix); see also Sale, supra note 1, at 462 
(implying that the duty of care is effectively unenforceable in Delaware and noting that “care-based cases are in the 
minority of derivative and class action cases….”).  
8
 Jones, supra, note 1, at 646-51.  
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2But in the years since Enron and other corporate scandals directed the nation’s attention 
to corporate governance issues, Delaware courts have seemingly become more receptive to the 
claims of shareholder plaintiffs.  Although the courts have generally refrained from expressly 
overruling prior cases, many commentators believe that the protective scope of Section 102(b)(7) 
has been sharply diminished by good faith, a nebulous concept lying somewhere between grossly 
negligent lack of care and intentional, self-interested disloyalty.
By way of background, the paper begins with a brief history of the duty of care and its de 
facto marginalization by Section 102(b)(7).  It then traces the slow development of good faith as 
an independent fiduciary obligation, culminating in the much-hyped denial of the defendants’ 
motion to dismiss in the Disney litigation.9  Since that decision, academic commentators have 
spilled gallons of ink trying to decipher the exact contours of good faith, either distinguishing or 
equating it with care or loyalty.  The paper will briefly examine a few theories that attempt to 
shape good faith into a coherent and workable framework.  
But in light of recent developments in Delaware law, the nature of the procedural 
landscape in which good faith is litigated may end up becoming more important than the exact 
definition of good faith in determining whether a particular director will be subject to monetary 
damages.  With an eye toward the practical effects of fiduciary duty jurisprudence, the paper 
follows the path of a typical shareholder lawsuit from injury to judgment, noting where good 
faith has combined with other state and federal developments to change the fortunes of plaintiff 
shareholders and defendant directors.  
I conclude that recent developments in federal and state law, and in the rules of Self-
Regulatory Organizations (“SRO’s”), have had the cumulative effect of substantially altering 
Delaware’s litigation playing field in favor of shareholder plaintiffs.  By recognizing a cause of 
9 See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003) [hereinafter Disney II].  
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3action against directors who abdicate their fiduciary responsibilities, Delaware courts have made 
it virtually impossible for directors who breached their duty of care to win dismissals of 
shareholder lawsuits on the pleadings.  An increasing number of fiduciary duty claims can be 
expected to survive a motion to dismiss, thereby raising the settlement value of such claims.  
Furthermore, those directors who fail to settle may bear a heavy evidentiary burden at trial.  In 
sum, the near-term effect of recent Delaware corporate jurisprudence will be to increase the 
number of settlements and judgments in favor of plaintiffs.   
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4I. The Rise and Fall of the Duty of Care as a Cause for Director Liability
Although the duty of care has long been an element of Delaware corporate law, it is not 
considered to be more than an “aspirational and unenforceable standard” in the context of suits 
for monetary damages against directors.10  But Delaware’s laxity with regard to the duty of care 
has at least one glaring exception.  In Smith v. Van Gorkom the Delaware Supreme Court 
overturned the Chancery Court’s dismissal of a complaint that accused the directors of the Trans 
Union Corporation of breaching their duty of care in the course of approving a merger.11  The 
court noted that the defendants had not been accused of “fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing,” but 
concluded that loyalty and good faith alone were insufficient.12  In addition, directors were 
obligated to reasonably inform themselves of all relevant information before making important 
corporate decisions, and could be held personally liable for grossly negligent failures to live up 
to this obligation.13
The reaction to Van Gorkom was swift and overwhelmingly negative.  Although the 
Delaware Supreme Court had concluded that the directors were grossly negligent, most 
observers believed that the conduct in question at worst amounted to simple negligence.14
10
 Jones, supra, note 1, at 647-48; William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs, & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function Over Form: A 
Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. L. REV. 1287, 1290 (Aug. 2001) 
[hereinafter “Function over Form”]; see also Charles R.T. O’Kelley & Robert B. Thompson, CORPORATIONS AND 
OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 239 (Aspen Publishers 4th ed. 2003) (describing the search for cases finding 
liability for breaches of the duty of care in industrial corporations “as akin to ‘a search for a very small number of 
needles in a very large haystack’”) (quoting Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in 
the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968)).
11
 488 A.2d 858, 864 (Del. 1985).
12 Id. at 873.
13 Id. at 877.
14
 Jones, supra note 1, at 647 (“Van Gorkom…has been almost uniformly criticized.”); see also, e.g., Function Over 
Form, supra note 10, at 1300; David Rosenberg, Making Sense of Good Faith in Delaware Corporate Fiduciary 
Law: A Contractarian Approach, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 496-97 (2004).  But see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey 
P. Miller, Trans Union Reconsidered, 98 YALE L.J. 127, 128 (1988) (arguing that Van Gorkom was neither 
surprising nor threatening when viewed as a takeover case); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 Harvard L. 
Rev. 588, 633 n.183 (2003) (speculating that the Enron and Worldcom debacles may have been prevented if “Van 
Gorkom had survived”).  
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5Insurance companies “sharply increased their premiums,” and even threatened to stop  
underwriting Directors’ and Officers’ (D&O) liability insurance.15  Sensing a potential corporate 
flight from the Delaware, the state legislature enacted Section 102(b)(7), allowing directors to be 
exculpated from liability for all breaches of the duty of care.16  Most corporations quickly took 
advantage of the new statute,17 thus rendering the duty of care mostly unenforceable by 
litigation.18
II. The Dawn of the Post-Enron Era
Although the duty of care no longer plays a prominent role in Delaware suits for 
monetary damages, in recent years the Delaware courts appear to have expanded the duties of 
good faith and loyalty in ways that cast doubt on Section 102(b)(7)’s continued ability to 
effectively shield directors from liability.19  Most commentators believe recent cases, at least 
when viewed collectively, represent a shift in Delaware fiduciary duty law in favor of 
15 Function Over Form, supra note 10, at 1300 n.49.
16 See Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 497 (“Delaware did not become the center of American corporate law by 
ignoring the needs and worries of corporate directors.”); see also Sean Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A 
Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L. J. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript of July 17, 
2005 at 62 n.260) http://ssrn.com/abstract=728431 (noting that the threat of corporations leaving Delaware was 
made credible by Indiana’s prior enactment of an exculpation statute). 
17
 William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Realigning the Standard of Review of Director Due Care with 
Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and its Progeny as a Standard of Review Problem, 96 NW. U. 
L. REV. 449, 463 (2001-2002) [hereinafter “Critique of Van Gorkom”]; see also REV’D MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT 
§202(b)(4) (2002).  
18
 However, the statute does not preclude suits for injunctive relief.  Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1095 
(Del. 2001).  Nor does it apply retroactively.  §102(b)(7); see also Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 
350-51 (Del. 1993) (applying the duty of care to a transaction that predated Section 102(b)(7)’s enactment).
    Most importantly, Delaware law permits exculpation for directors, but not officers.  See §102(b)(7).  At the time 
of Section 102(b)(7)’s enactment, this discrepancy could be explained by the fact that the Delaware Court of 
Chancery did not have jurisdiction over officer defendants.  However, a recent amendment to the Delaware Code 
now enables the Court of Chancery to exercise personal jurisdiction over corporate officers, thereby leaving them 
unprotected from liability for breaches of the duty of care.  See S.B. 126, 142d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2003) 
(enacted) (codified as amended at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114).
19
 Three current and former Delaware judges have doubted the continued effectiveness of Section 102(b)(7).  
Critique of Van Gorkom, supra note 17, at 462-64.
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6shareholder plaintiffs.20  According to these commentators, the shift began as Enron and 
WorldCom brought corporate governance to the nation’s attention, prompting the federal 
government and the national securities exchanges to regulate what had previously been the 
exclusive terrain of state corporate law.21  Seeking to protect its turf from additional federal 
preemption, the Delaware judiciary has suddenly begun to enforce fiduciary duties with 
uncharacteristic vigor.22
On the other hand, at least one Delaware judge rejects the notion that the courts respond 
to current events, even when those events present a threat of federal preemption.  Chancellor 
Chandler writes:
“Judges…decide cases based on the particularized facts before them, not on 
whether it will affect the competitive position of the state via other competitors 
for corporate charters…And in a larger sense, I also think academics sometimes 
miss the point that judges are not legislators, and they are not given a commission 
to change the laws based on the headlines of the day.”23
Chancellor Chandler’s opinion is at least partly shared by E. Norman Veasey, a former 
Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, who denies that Delaware’s “substantive law 
20
 Between June of 2002 and the spring of 2004, the Delaware Supreme Court overruled six Chancery Court 
decisions, in each case reversing a chancery decision that had favored director defendants.  Jones, supra note 1, at 
625 (viewing the reversals as a “sharp departure” from earlier practice ); Roe, supra note 14, at 643; Sale, supra note 
1, at 459-60.
21
 For a detailed overview of the intersections between state fiduciary duty law and the post-Enron federal regulatory 
regime, see generally Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149 (2004).  In all fairness to Delaware, it should be noted that neither Enron nor 
Worldcom were Delaware corporations.  Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, 
REGULATION, Spring 2003, at 30.
22
 Jones, supra note 1, at 645 (concluding that the “trend toward stricter judicial scrutiny of director decision-
making” reflects “the tenor behind judicial pronouncements about the risk of federal preemption”); see also Roe, 
supra note 14, at 643.  
23
 E-mail from William B. Chandler III, Chancellor, Delaware Court of Chancery, to Renee M. Jones, Assistant 
Professor, Boston College Law School (Nov. 6, 2003) reprinted in Jones, supra note 1, at 662-63 n.279.  But see
William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American Corporate Governance System: 
Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 1005 (2003) (seeing changes 
in federal law and in national exchange listing requirements as “an invitation for the states to join as full partners in 
the creative process of reform”) [hereinafter New Federalism].  
ExpressO Preprint Series
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
7has…changed.”24  Rather, Veasey attributes recent Delaware cases to improved pleading by 
shareholder plaintiffs, assuring directors that “the legal reality today is identical to the legal 
reality a year ago.”25   But in an earlier forum, he candidly acknowledged the need for Delaware 
courts to adopt its corporate law to a new era, stating that “[i]f we don’t fix it, Congress will, but 
I hope they’ve gone as far as they’re going to have to go.”26
Whether or not Delaware fiduciary duty law has truly shifted is beyond the scope of this 
article.  But without a doubt, many officers and directors perceive themselves as being far more 
vulnerable to suit than they were five years ago.27  The remainder of this article explores the 
legal doctrines behind the current perception. 
III.Evolving Notions of Good Faith
Of all the post-Enron developments in Delaware corporate law, none has generated more 
attention, nor created more uncertainty, than the prospect of holding directors liable solely for 
breaching their duty of good faith.  Of course, good faith did not emerge out of nowhere with the 
turn of the 21st century.  It has long played a role in contract law as an implied and non-
waiveable obligation of all parties to adhere “to an agreed common purpose” and to act 
24
 E. Norman Veasey, Counseling Directors in the New Corporate Culture, Address Before the Sixteenth Tulane 
Corporate Law Institute (Mar. 4, 2004), in 4 BUS. LAWYER 1447, 1449 (Aug. 2004).
25 Id.
26
 Charles Elson, What’s Wrong with Executive Compensation?, HARVARD BUS. REV. (Jan. 2003), at 77;. see also 
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Derivative Impact?  Some Early Reflections on the Corporation Law Implications of the Enron 
Debacle, 57 Bus. Law. 1371, 1372, 1401-02 (Aug. 2002) (highlighting the dangers of overzealous reform, but 
acknowledging the possibility that key aspects of corporate law could be federalized).  
27
 Veasey, supra note 24, at 1447 (“There is talk of storm clouds, revolution, transition, sea change, and the like.”); 
Gary W. Marsh & Petrina Hall, The Many Faces of Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, AMER. BANKR. INST. J. 14 (Sept. 
2003), at 54 (stating that a recent Delaware case “has many corporate directors concerned about their own personal 
liability when making decisions on behalf of their corporations”).  
     The liability concerns of directors were reflected in the choice of topics for the recent Directors’ Education 
Institute at Duke University.  At least half of the sessions, including many of the best-attended, were devoted to 
liability, regulatory compliance, and disclosure issues.  See DUKE UNIV. GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS CENTER, 
PROGRAM FOR THE DIRECTORS’ EDUCATION INST. (March 16-18, 2005), at 3, available at www.DukeDEI.org (last
accessed Mar. 29, 2005) (on file with author).
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8“consistently with the justified expectations of the other party.”28  Nor was the concept new to 
corporation law, at least as an aspiration directorial obligation, or as one of a litany of 
presumptions underlying the business judgment rule.29
But bad faith was not seen as an independent basis for director liability until recently.  In 
Caremark, then-Chancellor Allen suggested that “a sustained or systematic failure of the board 
to exercise oversight…will establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to 
liability.”30  This suggestion was significant because the obligation to keep oneself reasonably 
informed of a corporation’s activities had traditionally fallen under the duty of care.31
Furthermore, the board’s failure to monitor could not be characterized as disloyalty because it 
did not place the interests of the board-members ahead of the interests of the corporation and its 
shareholders.32  By characterizing a sustained failure to monitor as bad faith, the court placed an 
entire category of activity (or omission) beyond the protective grasp of Section 102(b)(7).  
In a case applying Illinois law, but which drew heavily from Delaware corporate law, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit also recognized an independent duty of 
good faith.33  The defendant directors in this case had allegedly failed to respond, over the course 
of six years, to FDA warnings, “inspections…and notice in the press” of the company’s 
28
 E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 443 (Del. 1996) (quoting Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts §205, cmt. a. (1979)). 
29 See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“It is a presumption that in making a business 
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the 
action taken was in the best interests of the company.”) (emphasis added); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 
1939) (holding that Delaware law “demands of an officer or director the utmost good faith in his relation to the 
corporation which he represents”); Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (observing that directors, 
under New York law, must “faithfully give such ability as they have to their charge”).  
30 In re Caremark Intern. Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996); see also McCall v. Scott,  
250 F.3d 997, 1001 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding, under Delaware law, that directors’ good faith could be brought into 
doubt by allegations of “intentional ignorance of and willful blindness to red flags signaling fraudulent practices”).
31 See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993); Hoye v. Meek, 795 F.2d 893, 895 
(10th Cir. 1986); William Meade Fletcher, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §1034.80 (updated 
Nov. 2004).  
32 See Cede, 634 A.2d at 361 (describing loyalty as a demand that “there be no conflict between duty and self-
interest”) (quoting Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 270 (Del. 1939)).
33 In re Abbot Laboratories Derivative S’holder Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 811 (7th Cir. 2003).  
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9noncompliance with federal regulations.34  According to the complaint, the directors’ sustained 
inattention “resulted in the largest civil fine ever imposed by the FDA and the destruction and 
suspension of products which accounted for approximately $250 million in corporate assets.”35
The court reasoned that the directors’ conduct as described in the complaint amounted to “a 
conscious disregard of known risks, which…cannot have been undertaken in good faith.”36
A. Good Faith as an Independent Obligation Versus Good Faith as a Subset of Loyalty
The conception of good faith advanced in Caremark was explicitly endorsed by former 
Chief Justice Veasey,37 and the court has on multiple occasions characterized good faith, along 
with care and loyalty, as forming a “triad” of fiduciary duties.38  In addition, Section 102(b)(7)(i) 
forbids exculpation for breaches of the duty of loyalty, while a separate clause mandates liability 
“for acts or omissions not in good faith.”39  To hold that good faith is a subset of loyalty would 
reduce a separately numbered statutory clause to mere surplusage, thus violating traditional 
“canons of statutory construction.”40
34 Id. at 809.  
35 Id.
36 Id. at 811 (quoting McCall v. Scott, 250 F.3d 997, 1001) (6th Cir. 2001).  
37
 Veasey, supra note 24, at 1455.
38
 Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 91 (Del. 2001); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) 
(“[G]ood faith…is a key ingredient of the business judgment rule.”); Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998); 
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).  But see id. at 368 n.36 (equating good faith with 
loyalty).
39
 §102(b)(7)(ii).  Good faith has been codified in several areas of the Delaware Corporation Law.  See, e.g., DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, §141(e) (2001) (permitting directors to rely “in good faith upon the records of the corporation and 
upon such information, opinions, reports or statements presented to the corporation…”) (emphasis added); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, §145 (2001) (allowing corporations to indemnify officers, directors, or agents who act in good 
faith).  
40
 Griffith, supra note 16, at 15 (citing R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 233 
(1975).  Had the Delaware legislature sought to subsume the duty of good faith into the duty of loyalty, it had ample 
examples from other jurisdictions of how to do so.  See, e.g., MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT. §2.02(b)(4)(B) (2002) 
(omitting any mention of good faith but prohibiting exculpation for, inter alia, “an intentional infliction of harm on 
the corporation or the shareholders”).
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But the notion of good faith as a separate fiduciary duty is far from universally approved 
within Delaware’s judiciary.41  On the contrary, Chancellor Chandler,42 Vice Chancellor Strine43
and former Vice-Chancellor Jacobs44 have characterized the duty of good faith as subsidiary to 
the duty of loyalty, thus negating the possibility that a director could be held liable for bad faith 
without satisfying the requirements for disloyalty.  According to this view, “while it is possible 
to act in good faith and not be loyal, ‘there is no case in which a director can act in subjective 
bad faith towards the corporation and act loyally.’”45
Perhaps it was inevitable that the Court of Chancery would eventually yield to its 
jurisdictional superiors in the state Supreme Court.  In a recent Delaware case arising out of the 
expensive, short-lived, and rocky tenure of a president of the Walt Disney Company, the 
Chancellor recognized the existence of a separate duty of good faith.46  In denying a motion to 
dismiss a derivative complaint, the court held that the directors’ alleged failure to exercise “any
business judgment or [to make] any good faith attempt to fulfill” their fiduciary duties could 
subject them to personal liability for monetary damages.47  The directors could be held liable 
despite the fact that their loyalty was not in question, and even though they were protected from 
41 See Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 505 (concluding that the Delaware Court of Chancery is in “open revolt” against 
the good faith jurisprudence of the state supreme court).
42 E.g., Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 14 n.3 (Del. Ch. 2002).  But see generally Disney II, 825 A.2d 275 (denying 
defendants’ motion to dismiss on the ground that bad faith had been adequately pleaded, even though plaintiffs had 
not alleged disloyalty); see also infra, notes 46-48 and accompanying text.  
43 In re Gaylord Container Corp. Shareholders Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 476 n.41 (Del. Ch. 2000) (labeling good faith as 
“subsidiary” to loyalty).  But see Strine, supra note 26, at 1385-86 (correctly predicting that courts will be called 
upon to assess the good faith of directors who had no “financial interest in the underlying conduct”).  
44
 Emerald Partners v. Berlin, Civ. Action No. 9700 (Feb. 7, 2001), 2001 WL 115340, at *25 n.63  (observing that 
good faith “does not exist separate and apart from the fiduciary duty of loyalty”), overruled in part on other grounds 
by 787 A.2d 85 (Del. 2001).  Justice Jacobs was later appointed to the Delaware Supreme Court.  See also Emerald 
Partners v. Berlin, No. 9700, 2003 WL 21003437, at *39 n.133 (Del. Ch. Apr. 28, 2003), aff’d, 840 A.2d 641 (table) 
(Del. 2003); Griffith, supra note 16, at 6 n.11 (discussing Delaware decisions that subsume good faith within 
loyalty); Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 500-01 (same).
45 See Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003).
46 Disney II, 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003).  
47 Id. at 287.
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duty of care claims by Section 102(b)(7).48  In effect, the court recognized a derivative cause of 
action against loyal directors whose acts or omissions “are either ‘not in good faith’ or ‘involve 
intentional misconduct.’”49
Applying this cause of action to the complaint, the court observed that the plaintiffs’ 
allegations, 
“if true, do more than portray directors who, in a negligent or grossly negligent 
manner, merely failed to inform themselves or to deliberate adequately about an 
issue of material importance to their corporation.  Instead, the facts 
alleged…suggest that the defendant directors consciously and intentionally 
disregarded their responsibilities, adopting a “we don’t care about the risks” 
attitude concerning a material corporate decision.”50
Disney II has generated numerous academic commentaries devoted to explaining and 
delimiting the duty of good faith.51  The following section will summarize a number of theories 
that seek to explain how the duty of good faith can exist separately from the duties of care and 
loyalty.  The paper will then leave the academic laboratory to explore the duty of good faith in its 
own habitat, namely the Delaware judicial system.  In other words, the paper will explore what 
48 See id. at 286-87 (observing that the Disney board was “disinterested and independent”).  
49 Id. at 290 (quoting §102(b)(7)(ii)); see also Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v. N.C.T. Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 
772, 800 (Del. Ch. 2004) (holding that a board could be held liable for bad faith conduct even though it was 
“putatively independent”).
50 Id. at 289 (emphasis in original).  In an apparent sign of approval, the Delaware Supreme Court later adopted 
language from Disney II.  Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 840 A.2d 641 (table), No. 295, 2003 WL 23019210, at *1 
(Del. Dec. 23, 2003).
51
 Most of the academic reviews appear to be favorable.  See generally, e.g., Sale, supra note 1; Rosenberg, supra 
note 14; Griffith, supra note 16.  But see Matthew R. Berry, Note, Does Delaware’s Section 102(b)(7) Protect 
Reckless Directors from Personal Liability?  Only if Delaware Courts Act in Good Faith, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1125, 
1140 (2004) (criticizing Disney II as effectively equating bad faith with recklessness, a level of conduct that should 
have been exculpated under Section 102(b)(7)). 
    The judicial reaction to Disney II has been mixed.  On the one hand, the Court of Chancery has continued to resist 
treating good faith as a separate fiduciary duty, mostly declining to decide whether deliberate indifference should be 
categorized as bad faith, disloyalty, or both.  See, e.g., Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated 
Health Svcs., Inc. v. Elkins, No. Civ.A 20228-NC (Del. Ch., Aug. 24, 2004), 2004 WL 1949290, at *9-10; 
Emerging Communications, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 16415 (Del. Ch., June 4, 2004), 2004 WL 1305745, at 
*39 n.184.  On the other hand, it has shown a willingness to hold directors accountable for intentionally and 
consciously disregarding their responsibilities, even if it has hesitated to definitively label the basis for liability as 
either bad faith or disloyalty. See, e.g., Elkins, 2004 WL 1949290, at *12;  Emerging Communications, 2004 WL 
1305745, at *39 n.184.  Thus, the Chancery court’s “open revolt” against the “triad” of duties may amount to little 
more than an argument over semantics.  See Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 505; Discussion, supra note 41 and 
accompanying text.
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the practical effect will be of adding good faith to the multitude of procedural and substantive 
doctrines that comprise Delaware’s corporate law.  
B. Good Faith as an Academic Debate
In one of the first attempts to separate good faith “from what a defendant might prefer to 
characterize as a care-based situation,” Sale noted that issues of good faith could arise from “an 
obvious or egregious violation, resulting from abdication, subversion, or deliberate 
indifference….”52  The characterization of good faith as an egregious violation of the duty of 
care is an unfortunate development in recent case law, as it creates needless uncertainty 
regarding how “egregious” an activity must be before it can be categorized as bad faith rather 
than lack of care.
Even without the protections of Section 102(b)(7) directors would not face liability for 
monetary damages unless they acted or failed to act with gross negligence.53  This standard 
already causes much hair-splitting in distinguishing the requisite gross negligence from mere 
“ordinary” negligence.54  To again split the remaining half-hairs into “simple” gross negligence 
and “egregious” gross negligence would force the Delaware judiciary to make incoherent and 
artificial distinctions.55  Most likely, no conduct would remain outside of the business judgment 
52
 Sale, supra note 1, at 488-89; see also Elkins, 2004 WL 1949290, at *9 n.37 (speculating that Disney II may be 
explained as a “duty of care claim that is so egregious—that essentially alleges the Board abdicated its responsibility 
to make any business decision—that it” raises questions about the defendants’ good faith); Beam v. Stewart, 833 
A.2d 961, 984-85 (Del. Ch. 2003) (same).
53
 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
54
 The most concise (and arguably the most helpful) distinction that the author is aware of was made by Judge 
Magruder, who described Chief Justice Rugg’s definitions of negligence, gross negligence, and recklessness as 
amounting to conduct by “a fool, a damn fool, and a God-damn fool,” respectively.  George Christie, Vagueness and 
Legal Language, 48 MINN. L. REV. 885, 899 (1964) (quoting HARV. L. RECORD, Apr. 16, 1959, at 7).  
55
 Of course, the duties of care, loyalty and good faith can occasionally overlap.  However, one duty cannot be 
expanded to the point of swallowing another whole without eviscerating legislative and judicial acknowledgements 
of the existence of three separate duties.  See Discussion, supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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rule that could be protected under a duty-of-care exculpation provision.56  Furthermore, the 
Delaware Supreme Court counsels against defining bad faith as an extreme lack of care, stating 
that “[c]onsiderations of good faith are irrelevant in determining” whether directors exercised 
“informed business judgment.”57
On the other hand, defining bad faith as an egregious breach of the duty of care would
make sense if one accepts the view of the majority of commentators that Van Gorkom wrongly 
applied duty of care analysis to conduct that at worst amounted to simple negligence.58  Under 
such a view, the good faith exception to director exculpation could be seen as preserving liability 
for breaches of the duty of care for conduct that is truly grossly negligent, but not for conduct 
evincing the same level of culpability as the activity described in Van Gorkom.59  However, this 
56 Cf., Critique of Van Gorkom, supra note 17, at 457 (noting that shareholders as a whole will suffer if director 
liability is predicated “on the ground that the investment was too risky…foolishly risky! stupidly risky! egregiously 
risky!—you supply the adverb…”) (internal parentheses omitted) (quoting Gagliardi v. TriFoods, Int’l, Inc., 683 
A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
57 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 889 (emphasis added).  But the fact that bad faith is not a function of the egregiousness 
of a well-motivated business decision does not mean that courts cannot consider the egregiousness of a decision in 
evaluating whether the defendants were truly well-motivated.  In re J.P. Stevens & Co. S’holders Litig., 542 A.2d 
770, 780-81 (Del. Ch.1988) (“A court may, however, review the substance of a business decision made by an 
apparently well motivated board for the limited purpose of assessing whether that decision is so far beyond the 
bounds of reasonable judgment that it seems essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith.”) (quoted 
in John L. Reed & Matt Neiderman, “Good Faith” and the Ability of Directors to Assert §102(b)(7) of the Delaware 
General Corporation Law as a Defense to Claims Alleging Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and similar Breaches of 
Fiduciary Duty, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 111, 123-24 (2004)).  
58 See Discussion, supra, note 14 and accompanying text.  
59
 For an example of how §102(b)(7) could eviscerate Van Gorkom's interpretation of gross negligence while still 
leaving room for liability under a theory of bad faith, see Apple Computer, Inc. v. Exponential Tech., Inc., No. 
16315, 1999 WL 39547 (Del. Ch. Jan. 21, 1999).  There the court held that a board’s failure to “even attempt to 
comply with its statutory obligation” to obtain shareholder approval before selling substantially all of the 
corporation’s assets would constitute gross negligence.  Id. at *7.  The Exponential board’s conduct would probably 
not have been classified as gross negligence under traditional standards because the allegedly wrongful sale occurred 
in the wake of cataclysmic external events that largely obliterated any chance that the corporation would profit from 
its former business.  Id. at *5.  Thus, the sale was arguably a reasonable, or at most an ordinarily negligent attempt to 
quickly dispose of the corporation’s assets before they began to drain the corporate treasury.  See id.
     Nonetheless, after comparing the allegations in the complaint with the alleged conduct of the board in Van 
Gorkom, the court concluded that the complaint raised a sufficient inference of gross negligence on the part of 
Exponential’s board to state a claim for breach of the duty of care.  Id. at *7 n.30 (“If [the Trans Union] board’s 
uninformed, hasty approval of a merger constitutes gross negligence in breach of its duty of care under 8 Del. C. §§ 
141 & 251(b), it follows that [Exponential’s] failure to hold a shareholder vote under §271 (and §141) would 
constitute gross negligence in violation of the board’s duty of care….”).  However, the court dismissed the 
complaint because the board-members were exculpated from liability for duty of care violations under Section 
102(b)(7).  Id. at *8.
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view of Section 102(b)(7) does not comport with the text of the statute, which unambiguously 
forbids exculpation for bad faith, but not for lack of care.  Furthermore, in Brehm the Delaware 
Supreme Court appears to have adopted a more rigorous standard of gross negligence than the 
one applied in Van Gorkom, thus making it unnecessary to use good faith as a dividing line 
between exculpable and “truly” grossly negligent duty of care violations.60  Therefore, 
egregiousness is probably not an adequate dividing line between mere duty of care violations and 
bad faith.61
A far more promising view of good faith looks to the motives and intentions of the 
accused to determine whether his or her conduct amounted to bad faith.  David Rosenberg 
proposes that good faith be seen as a “contractarian” doctrine that requires parties to “adhere to 
the terms of the contract without knowingly attempting to evade those obligations to which [they 
have] voluntarily submitted [themselves].”62  When applied to a corporate director, the duty of 
good faith thus forbids any act or omission that “he knows violates the spirit of the obligations to 
which he has submitted himself by agreeing to act as a corporate director.”63  In other words, 
“[a] director’s duty of good faith is…the obligation to try to perform his duties 
according to his understanding of what the corporate charter and existing law 
demand from him….  [H]e must do his best to use care; and he must honestly try 
to carry out any other promise he has made to those who have entrusted him with 
control of their corporation.”64
60 See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 249, 259 (Del. 2000) (holding that the complaint failed to allege gross 
negligence even though the defendants’ approval of a “luxurious” executive compensation package was carried out 
using lax procedures that “were hardly paradigms of good corporate governance practice”); Critique of Van 
Gorkom, supra, note 17, at 464-65 (viewing Brehm as a signal of the end of “the de fact misapplication of the gross 
negligence standard of review). 
61 Accord Sale, supra note 1, at 489 (“Presumably…good faith claims must be different from negligence and gross 
negligence.”).
62
 Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 508; see also Sale, supra note 1, at 489 (suggesting that a claim of bad faith 
“requires motive-based allegations of severely reckless or seemingly intentional behavior”).
63 Id. at 509.  But see In re The Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation, C.A. No. 15452, 2005 WL 2056651, 
*35 n.449 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005) (distinguishing the duty of good faith owed by fiducies from the duty of good 
faith owed by parties to a contract) [hereinafter: Disney III].
64 Id. at 510, 513; see also Strine, supra note 26, at 1393 (predicting that plaintiffs will question the good faith of 
directors who consciously fail to devote "sufficient attention to [their] duties”).
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Rosenberg’s contractarian approach to good faith comports with Disney II, which 
recognized a cause of action against directors who “knew that they were making material 
decisions without adequate information and without adequate deliberation, [but]…simply did not 
care if the decision caused the corporation and its stockholders to suffer injury or loss.”65  By 
focusing on whether a director honestly tries to fulfill her duties, Rosenberg provides an 
apparently coherent framework in which good faith can be recognized as a separate fiduciary 
obligation.  
Rosenberg’s thesis also meshes with good faith’s tendency to expand the reach of non-
exculpable conduct to include passive activities or omissions, such as a board’s failure “to 
exercise any business judgment” or “to make any good faith attempt to fulfill [its] fiduciary 
duties.”66  Delaware courts have generally limited findings of disloyalty to situations where 
defendants actively worked to disadvantage their firms by, for example, usurping a corporate 
opportunity67 or engaging in an interested transaction.68  In contrast, the duty of good faith can 
punish inaction, provided that the failure to act was motivated by a conscious disregard for the 
corporation’s welfare.69  The effect of characterizing good faith in terms of abdication of duty 
has been to focus plaintiffs’ lawyers attention on directors who were either apathetic to their 
duties, or who were too overloaded with other responsibilities to have possibly focused enough 
65 Disney II, 825 A.2d at 289 (emphasis in original). 
66 Id. at 278. 
67 See, e.g., Yiannatsis v. Stephanis by Sterianou, 653 A.2d 275, 278-79 (Del. 1995).
68 See, e.g., In re Emerging Communications S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A 16415, 2004 WL 1305745, at *39 (Del. 
Ch. June 4, 2004).
69 E.g., Disney II, 825 A.2d at 278 (holding that directors’ good faith can be placed in doubt by “[a]llegations that 
[they] abdicated all responsibility to consider appropriately an action of material importance to the corporation”); In 
re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996) (suggesting that a board’s “sustained or 
systemic failure” to monitor compliance with regulatory requirements could raise doubts about the board’s good 
faith); see also Disney III, C.A. No. 15452, 2005 WL 2056651, *35 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005) (noting that sloth could 
constitute bad faith if it amounted to "a systematic or sustained shirking of duty").
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attention on the corporations they served, and who therefore allowed their corporation to be 
injured.70
But although Delaware courts have occasionally described conduct that could amount to 
bad faith,71 they have never attempted to comprehensively establish where good faith begins or 
ends.  Therefore, the Delaware courts have not foreclosed the possibility of applying good faith 
to situations that do not fall into Rosenberg’s (or anyone else’s) model.  According to one 
commentator, the judicial open-endedness is no accident, but is a direct consequence of the fact 
that good faith only has meaning “as a rhetorical device” and not as a “substantive standard.”72
In Griffith’s view, the duties of care and loyalty are essentially guideposts that point courts 
70 See, e.g., Disney II, 825 A.2d 287-88 (holding that the Disney board’s good faith was placed in doubt by the 
allegation that it spent less than an hour discussing a gigantic compensation agreement for its new president and did 
not appear to have met at all to discuss his no-fault termination barely a year later).  In the wake of the Enron and 
Worldcom scandals much attention was paid to allegedly docile and indifferent boards who allowed “imperial” 
CEO’s to act with impunity.  See Arthur Levitt Jr., The Imperial CEO Is No More, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2005, at 
A16.  
     A number of regulators and judges have signaled that the law demands a board to be far more engaged and 
empowered.  For example, in a recent roundtable discussion then-Chief Justice Veasey challenged directors “who 
are supposed to be independent [to] have the guts to be a pain in the neck and act independently.”  Elson, supra note 
26, at 76; see also Strine, supra note 26, at 1391 (doubting that Enron’s audit committee could have effectively 
carried out its responsibilities when it only met five times in a year); Remarks of Robert K. Herdman, Chief 
Accountant of the S.E.C., at the Tulane Corp. Law Inst. (Mar. 7, 2002) (opining that “spending an hour together 
three and four times a year probably is not sufficient” time for an audit committee to adequately perform its 
functions.”) (quoted in Strine, supra note 26, at 1389 n.55).
      Commentators have expressed varying views on the wisdom of recent state, federal, and SRO mandates that 
directly or indirectly compel board-members of public corporations to become more engaged.  For a general 
discussion, see Strine, supra note 26, at 1385-95; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the NYSE’s 
Director Independence Listing Standards, 30 SEC. REG. L. J. 370, 376 (2002) (noting that increased time demands 
have made it “increasingly difficult” for public corporations to “recruit and retain qualified independent directors”).  
On the other hand, some researchers have noted a positive correlation between firms with overly busy boards, who 
therefore lack sufficient time to devote to the enterprise, and weak corporate governance.  See Eliezer M. Fich & 
Anil Shivdasani, Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors? (October 2004) EUROPEAN CORP. GOV. INST., Finance 
Working Paper No. 55/2004, at 29, available at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=607364 (defining “busy” boards as “those 
in which a majority of outside directors hold three or more directorships”). 
71 See, e.g., Disney II, 825 A.2d at 289; In re Caremark Intern. Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. 
Ch. 1996).  
72
 Griffith, supra note 16, at 7.  It should be noted that Griffith did not intend to use the term “rhetorical device”
derogatively.  Id.at 8.  
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toward a more fundamental principle of corporate law, namely, “[a]re the directors doing their 
best in acting for someone else?”73
The duty of good faith becomes relevant when directors violate this fundamental 
principle, but do so “without checking all of the boxes for liability under either" loyalty or good 
faith.”74  In such instances liability may be found by resorting to a mode of thinking labeled 
"thaumatrope analytics," in which the court shuffles between the concepts of care and loyalty 
until a blurry picture of overall wrongdoing is created that adds up to bad faith.75
IV. Good Faith in the Context of Delaware Litigation
The above discussion summarizes the thoughtful and nuanced debate that Disney II has 
inspired within the academic community about the meaning of good faith.  But such subtle 
distinctions will ultimately mean little in actual fiduciary duty litigation because good faith does 
not operate in a vacuum, but in the intricately woven network of procedural rules, shifting 
burdens of proof, and federal influences that form the backdrop of Delaware corporate law.  
When courts apply good faith to real cases while following the procedural and evidentiary rules 
that pertain to Delaware corporate law, any theory that sees good faith as more than a mere 
subset of loyalty will result in some directors being forced to pay damages, regardless of the 
existence of an exculpation provision, for duty of care violations.  This is not necessarily because 
73 Id. at 42; see also Ehud Kamar, Shareholder Litigation Under Indeterminate Corporate Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 
887, 891 (1999) (arguing that the essential message of Delaware corporate law “is that corporate fiduciaries simply 
must do their utmost to promote shareholder interests”).
74 Griffith, supra note 16, at 43.  
75 Id. at 36-42.  A thaumotrope is an optical toy consisting of a disk with two complementary images (such as a man 
and a horse) on opposite sides.  When the disk is hung by a string and spun around an axis, it creates the illusion of a 
single drawing, such as that of a man riding a horse.  Id. at 35 (quoting Leon S. Lipson, The Allegheny College Case, 
23 YALE L. REP. 8, 11 (1977).  Perhaps the most famous example of thaumatrope analytics is the classic Allegheny 
College case, in which J. Cardozo oscillated between principles of consideration and promissory estoppel in order to 
hold the defendant liable for breach of contract.  See generally Allegheny Coll. v. Nat’l Chautauqua County Bank of 
Jamestown, 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927); see also Griffith, supra note 16, at 35 n.141 (quoting Lipson, supra, at 11); 
Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 781 (Del. Ch. 2004) (concluding that the 
facts alleged in “combination generate[] an aroma of fiduciary infidelity”).
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care and good faith are theoretically inseparable.  On the contrary, Rosenberg’s view of good 
faith is both supported by case law and distinct from care.76  But in the context of an actual case, 
it will be very difficult for a director who failed to exercise due care to prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that she nevertheless acted in good faith.  Moreover, it will be nearly impossible 
for her to win a dismissal on the pleadings or summary judgment. 
For plaintiffs, the ability to move beyond the pleading stages of a fiduciary duty suit is 
nearly as valuable as a judgment on the merits, since the settlement value of most suits will be 
far higher after the denial of a motion to dismiss than when a claim is first filed.77  Therefore it is 
surprising that so little attention has been paid to how a creative plaintiffs’ attorney can use both 
Sarbanes-Oxley and recent Delaware good faith jurisprudence as a tool to bring a case to trial.  
This section outlines the procedural landscape facing shareholder plaintiffs with potential 
claims.  To illustrate the background in which bad faith claims will be litigated, the section 
begins by summarizing the standards of review that pertain to Delaware corporate cases, and 
then discusses the evidentiary burdens that arise when a defendant presents exculpation as a 
defense under Section 102(b)(7).  It then follows the path of a typical shareholder lawsuit, 
beginning with pre-filing investigation by the plaintiff and ending at trial.  At every stage, an 
independent duty of good faith will remove rocks and brambles that previously stood in the way 
of the shareholders’ path to recovery. 
76 See Discussion, supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.  
77 See Bruce D. Angiolillo, Settlement Issues in Securities Class Actions: The Defense Perspective in 2004, 1442 
PRAC. L. INST. CORP. HANDBOOK SERIES 297, 303 (Sept.-Oct. 2004) (“Defendants do not want securities class 
actions settled – they want them dismissed.”).
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A. Standards of Review and Evidentiary Burdens
 A plaintiff shareholder’s fate will often depend on which standard of review applies to 
the claim in question.78  In the absence of allegations of breaches of fiduciary duties, most 
actions or omissions by officers and directors will merit review under the business judgment 
rule, a “venerable bludgeon that has whacked countless…derivative lawsuits.”79  Described by a 
former Delaware chief justice as “the foundation of our corporate law,”80 it forbids courts from 
second-guessing corporate officers or directors unless they “are interested or lack independence 
relative to the decision, do not act in good faith, …or reach their decision by a grossly negligent 
process that includes the failure to consider all material facts reasonably available.”81  Under the 
doctrine of waste, a corporate decision may still be invalidated if it “cannot be attributed to a 
rational business purpose.”82  But such a scenario is at most a theoretical possibility, since in real 
life a loyal fiduciary who exercises due care in making good faith decisions will not act 
irrationally.83  Therefore, once a court determines that the business judgment rule applies , the 
defendants can confidently expect the case to be dismissed.
On the other hand, in certain situations the applicable standard of review is more 
favorable to plaintiff shareholders.  For example, corporate defenses to takeover attempts that 
would result in a change in control are reviewed under an “intermediate scrutiny” standard.84  In 
78 Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 89 (“The applicable standard of judicial review often controls the outcome of the 
litigation on the merits.”).  For an in depth examination of the effects of standards of review on Delaware corporate 
law, see generally Function over Form, supra note 10.
79
 John Gibeaut, Stock Responses: Shareholders Ask for Changes in Corporate Governance, and the Courts are 
Starting to See it their Way, ABA JOURNAL 38 (Sept. 2003).
80Veasey, supra note 24, at 1454.
81
 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000).  The duty to examine all material facts essentially restates 
the duty of care and therefore will have no effect when the defendant is exculpated by a Section 102(b)(7) provision.  
See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1224 (Del. 1999) (“[W]here the factual basis for a claim solely
implicates a violation of the duty of care, this Court has indicated that the protections of such a charter provision 
may property be invoked and applied.”).   
82 Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264 n.66.
83 Critique of Van Gorkom, supra note 17, at 452 n.12.
84 Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 89 (Del. 2001).
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such cases, the court will ask whether the action taken by the target corporation was reasonable 
in light of the threat posed by the attempted takeover.85  The court will not overturn a defensive 
tactic merely because it would have acted differently in like circumstances, but only because it 
finds the tactic to have gone beyond the range of reasonable director conduct.86
Finally, Delaware courts reserve the most exacting standard of review for corporate acts 
that involve breaches of fiduciary duty,87 or for transactions where the same fiduciary stands on 
both sides of the table.88  In such circumstances, the fiduciaries must “demonstrate their utmost 
good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain.”89  In assessing the entire 
fairness of a corporate transaction, courts will normally place the burden of persuasion on the 
defendant, who must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the act was A) the product of 
fair dealing, and B) fairly priced.90
85 See Paramount Communications , Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1990).
86 See id.
87 See Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 91; Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (holding 
that when a shareholder provides evidence that directors breached their fiduciary duties, the directors then assume 
the burden of proving “the ‘entire fairness’ of the transaction…”) (quoting Nixon v. Blackwell , 626 A.2d 1366, 
1376 (Del. 1993).   The entire fairness test is often associated with self-dealing transactions and mergers, perhaps 
because cases finding breaches of fiduciary duty outside of those contexts are exceedingly rare.  However, the 
language of Cede applies by its terms to all breaches of fiduciary duties.  Id. In fact, in the Disney litigation both the 
plaintiffs and defendant Michael Ovitz seemed to agree that Ovitz would have had to demonstrate the entire fairness 
of his compensation if the court had found it to have been the product of a breach his fiduciary duty to the 
corporation.  Compare Reply Brief in Support of Defendant Michael Ovitz's Motion for Summary Judgment 
§II(A)(3), In Re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 15452, 2004 WL 1900551 (Del. Ch. Aug. 6, 2004) 
(arguing that Ovitz’s compensation arrangements were entirely fair to Disney) with Plaintiffs’ Post-Trial Brief 
§III(A), Consolidated C.A. No. 15452-NC, 2005 WL 656216 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 2005) (arguing that defendants have 
failed to establish the entire fairness of Ovitz’s compensation arrangements).
88 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983).  Entire fairness is also used to determine the validity of 
stock repurchases that eliminate “a threat to corporate policy” by removing a potentially troublesome shareholder.  
See Strassburger v. Earley, 752 A.2d 557, 571 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2000) (quoting Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 
(Del. 1962).
89 Weinberger, 457 A.2d. at 710.
90 Id. at 710-11.  In self-dealing transactions, the burden of persuasion will shift to the plaintiffs if the transaction 
had been “approved by a fully functioning independent committee of independent directors or by an informed 
majority of minority stockholders.”  In re Emerging Communications, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 16415 (Del. 
Ch., June 4, 2004), 2004 WL 1305745, at *10.  But even then, the standard of review remains entire fairness.  
Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 93 n.52.
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B. Sarbanes Oxley, Section 220, and the Drafting of a Well-Pled Complaint
To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff in a derivative suit cannot rely on “conclusory 
statements or mere notice pleadings” of director wrong-doing, but “must allege with particularity
facts raising a reasonable doubt that the corporate action being questioned was properly the 
product of business judgment.”91  This pleading requirement places “an almost impossible 
burden” on plaintiffs who, without the benefit of discovery, must plead facts with particularity 
that often are not public knowledge.92
However, plaintiffs are assisted in surmounting this “almost impossible burden” by 
Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, which permits shareholders to inspect the 
books and records of a corporation for any “proper purpose,” meaning a “purpose reasonably 
related to [their] interest as [] stockholder[s].”93  The Delaware Supreme Court has held that the 
investigation of “possible corporation wrongdoing” will be considered a proper purpose,94 as 
long as those seeking information “show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there is a 
legitimate chance that their reason for suspecting mismanagement is credible….”95  In fact, 
91
 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254-55 (Del. 2000) (emphasis added); see also Del. Ch. Ct. R. 23.1.  
Alternatively, the plaintiff may allege facts creating a reasonable doubt that the directors were “disinterested and 
independent.”  Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814.  
92 Brehm, 746 A.2d at 268 (Hartnett, J., concurring).  On the other hand, plaintiffs may in some cases be able to 
avoid the demand requirements of derivative actions by filing their complaints in the form of a class action.  See 
Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then Free Ride: How Delaware Law (Mis)Shapes Shareholder 
Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1800 (2004).
93 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §220(b) (2003).  Whether or not plaintiffs have access to such records could easily 
determine the outcome of a case.  For example, the most pertinent allegations in Disney II were discovered through a 
search of corporate records after the plaintiffs’ original complaint had been dismissed for failure to state a claim.  
825 A.2d 275, 279 (Del. Ch. 2003) (noting that the search of corporate records produced allegations portraying “a 
markedly different picture of…corporate processes…than that portrayed in the first amended complaint”).  
94
 Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 806 A.2d 113, 114 (Del. 2002).
95 Brehm, 746 A.2d at 267 n.75 (quoting Security First Corp. v. U.S. Die Casting & Dev. Corp., 687 A.2d 563,   
567-69 (Del. 1997)).  
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Delaware courts have criticized plaintiffs on multiple occasions for failing to take full advantage 
of their rights under Section 220 before initiating legal action.96
In addition to the board minutes, memoranda, financial records, and other sources that 
have traditionally been accessed through Section 220, plaintiffs will inevitably seek to 
investigate the extensive and potentially fruitful paper trails mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”).  For example, under Sarbanes-Oxley Section 301, corporations 
are now required to retain records of “complaints received…regarding accounting, internal 
accounting controls, or auditing matters.”97  These files will offer veritable treasure troves of 
information for imaginative plaintiffs attorneys who suspect a fiduciary of financial misconduct.  
Sarbanes Oxley may also co-opt a corporation’s attorneys to act in the service of  
shareholder plaintiffs through its “up-the-ladder” reporting requirement, since any such reports 
could potentially become the subject of a Section 220 inquiry.98  In fact, the Court of Chancery 
has even held that a shareholder’s desire to recoup investment losses resulting from an alleged 
breach of fiduciary duty can constitute sufficient cause to compel disclosure of privileged pre-
litigation legal advice.99  Even without using Section 220, plaintiffs may benefit from the reports 
96 E.g., Scattered Corp. v. Chicago Stock Exchange, Inc., 701 A.2d 70, 79 (Del., 1997) (denying plaintiffs’ request 
for discovery after they had “inexplicably” foregone a Section 220 search for relevant books and records); Beam v. 
Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc., 833 A.2d 961, 982-83 (2003) (discussing the utility of a books and records 
search, citing various cases where Delaware courts urged plaintiffs to engage in such investigations, and noting that 
plaintiffs’ failure to do so was generated by a “‘first to file’ custom seemingly permitting the winner of the race to be 
named lead counsel”) (quoting Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 935 n.10 (Del. 1993)).
97
 The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, codified at 15 U.S.C. §10A(4)(A).
98 See Sarbanes Oxley §307; Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the 
Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. §205.3(b) (2005) (obligating corporate attorneys to report 
“material violations” to the corporation’s officers and directors); 17 C.F.R. §205.2(i) (defining “material violation” 
as a “material violation of an applicable…federal or state securities law, a material breach of fiduciary 
duty…under…federal or state law, or a similar material violation of any…federal or state law.”).
99
 Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. Civ.A. 18553, 2002 WL 31657622, at *12-13 (Del. Ch. Nov. 13, 2002).  The 
reasoning in Saito was based on Deutsch v. Cogan, where the court limited the ability of corporate officers accused 
of injuring the corporation to claim that their communications with the corporation’s attorneys were privileged.  580 
A.2d 100, 106 (Del. Ch. 1990) (“[P]rotection of [shareholder] interests as well as those of the corporation and of the 
public require that the availability of the privilege be subject to the right of the stockholders to show cause why it 
should not be invoked in the particular instance.”) (quoting Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1103-04 (5th 
Cir. 1970); see also William Simon, Speech to the Fourth Annual Rabbi Seymour Siegel Memorial Lecture in 
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of corporate attorneys, who in some circumstances are now empowered by the regulations 
enacted pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley to communicate corporate misconduct to the S.E.C.100  Of 
course, plaintiffs are also free to investigate other “tools at hand,” such as public filings and facts 
gathered from the media.101
Much has been written about the extent to which Sarbanes Oxley and related reforms 
have preempted substantive state corporate law.102  In truth, the federal government will do far 
more than change the law; in many cases it will change the facts, or at least change the facts that 
can be pleaded.  By creating reams of information from which plaintiffs may draw, it has 
potentially transformed the shape of the litigation playing field in favor of plaintiffs.  
C. Good Faith at the Motion to Dismiss Stage
Armed with information gathered with “the tools at hand,”103 a plaintiff’s task at the 
motion to dismiss stage is somewhat simplified by the liberal pleading requirements of Del. R. 
Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6).104  Although judges may not consider conclusory allegations, “plaintiffs are 
entitled to all reasonable factual inferences that logically flow from the particularized facts 
alleged.”105
When a cause of action against directors who consciously disregard their responsibilities 
is applied to this most basic rule of civil procedure, the result is the effective elimination of 
Ethics, The Crisis of Professions in the Post-Enron Era, at Duke University School of Law (Mar. 3, 2005) (opining 
that the “corporate attorney-client privilege is vanishing.”), recording available in RealVideo format at 
http://realserver.law.duke.edu/ramgen/spring05/lawschool/03032005.rm.
100
 17 C.F.R. §205.3(d)(2).  
101
 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d. 244, 249 (Del. 2000) (quoting Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 935 n.10 (1993)).  
102
 For a thorough discussion of new federal intrusions in what was once state corporate law, see generally Johnson 
& Sides, supra note 21; Bainbridge, supra note 21; see also New Federalism, supra note 23, at 953; Roe, supra note 
14, at 632-34.
103 Brehm, 746 A.2d. at 266.
104
 The Delaware rules governing motions to dismiss are similar to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  See Del. R. Civil Proc. 12(b)(6) (2001); Del. Super. Ct. R. 12(b)(6) (2001).
105 Brehm, 746 A.2d at 255; see also Beam v. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc., 833 A.2d 961, 970 (Del. Ch. 
2003) (“The Court will not dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) any claim unless it appears to a reasonable certainty that the 
plaintiff cannot prevail on any set of facts which might be proven to support the allegations….”).  
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Section 102(b)(7) as viable means of keeping careless directors out of the courtroom.106  Even 
when a corporate charter does not provide for exculpation, a claim for monetary damages based 
on breaches of the duty of care will be dismissed unless the complaint alleges that the defendants 
acted with gross negligence in observing their duties.107  But just about any act or omission that 
can be performed negligently can also be done on purpose.  If the act occurred in a grossly
negligent manner, then its very “wantonness”108 raises a “factual inference”109 that the act was 
egregious, willful, badly-motivated, or perhaps “deliberately indifferent.”110  Thus, by alleging 
facts that amount to gross negligence, plaintiffs will generally earn the right to use discovery to 
attempt to dig up evidence of disloyalty or bad faith.111
Given its procedural posture, Disney II can be viewed as both less and more than what it 
initially seems.  On the one hand, the opinion can be seen as nothing more than a denial of a 
motion to dismiss that allows the parties to proceed with discovery.112  On the other hand, few 
people who have paid corporate attorneys’ fees, who have endured discovery, or who have stood 
trial for several times their net worth would ever be heard uttering the phrase “nothing more than 
a denial of a motion to dismiss.”  Nor should fiduciaries have much confidence in being able to 
106 Cf. Critique of Van Gorkom, supra note 17, at 462 (doubting the continued effectiveness of Section 102(b)(7)).
107 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (applying a standard of gross negligence to determine 
whether directors violated their duty of care).
108 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968), at 1185 (defining “gross negligence” as “such a gross want of 
care and regard for the rights of others as to justify the presumption of willfulness and wantonness).
109 See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 255.
110 See Disney II, 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003); see also Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 92 (Del. 
2001) (holding that director exculpation from duty of care violations should not result in dismissal of a complaint 
unless the facts alleged point exclusively to violations of the duty of care).
111
 The one circumstance where an exculpation provision may lead to the dismissal of complaint is when the 
complaint alleges conduct traditionally viewed as simple negligence but which nevertheless invokes the duty of care 
under Van Gorkom.  See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Exponential Tech., Inc., No. 16315, 1999 WL 39547, at *7 
(Del. Ch. Jan. 21, 1999); see also Critique of Van Gorkom, supra note 17, at 458 (stating that Van Gorkom
purported “to apply the gross negligence standard of review” but “in reality…applied an ordinary negligence 
standard”).  But since Brehm has now adopted a more rigorous standard of gross negligence, Delaware courts will 
be able to dismiss such suits for failure to allege any fiduciary duty violation, rather than for failing to allege conduct 
incapable of exculpation under Section 102(b)(7).  See Discussion, notes 59-60 and accompanying text.  
112 See Disney II, 825 A.2d at 291.  
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resolve their suits at summary judgment.  Since Disney II sets up a scienter-based standard,113
Delaware judges may hesitate to decide cases without hearing the testimony of those whose state 
of mind is being questioned.  In sum, Section 102(b)(7) may sometimes protect directors from 
liability, but it will almost never shield them from trial.  
D. Good Faith at Trial
Once a case goes to trial, the plaintiffs must strip defendants of the protections of the 
business judgment rule by proving that the defendants either committed waste or breached their 
fiduciary duties.114  That is, the plaintiffs must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
director defendant acted disloyally, in bad faith, or without the requisite level of care.  In the 
Disney trial, the court found little worthy of praise in the defendants' conduct, but ultimately held 
for the defendants because the plaintiffs had failed to prove a single breach of fiduciary duty.115
On the other hand, if a plaintiff proves that a breach of fiduciary duty ocurred, then the 
burden switches to the defendant, who must prove that the challenged transaction was entirely 
fair to the corporation.116  To establish  entire fairness, the defendant must first prove that the 
transaction was priced fairly for the corporation.117  In the context of a merger, courts normally 
decide the issue of fair price by appraising the target company with the help of expert 
113
 Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health South Servs., Inc. v. Elkins, No. Civ.A. 20228-NC,  
2004 WL 1949290, at *17 n.92 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2004).
114 See Disney III, C.A. No. 15452, 2005 WL 2056651, at *36 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005). However, if the claim 
concerns a self-interested transaction, then the defendant will have the burden of proving entire fairness ab initio.  
Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 98-99.
115
 Disney III, 2005 WL 2056651 at *1. 
116 Id. at *37; see also Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1163 (Del. 1995) (“[A]n initial judicial 
determination that a given breach of a board's fiduciary duties has rebutted the presumption of the business 
judgment rule does not preclude a subsequent judicial determination that the board action was entirely fair, and is, 
therefore, not outcome-determinative per se.”) (emphasis in original).  For an example of defendants meeting the 
burden to show entire fairness, see Emerald Partners v. Berlin, No. Civ.A. 9700 (Apr. 28, 2003), 2003 WL 
21003437, at *38 [hereinafter Emerald Partners III].
117
 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983).  The defendants need only prove that the price was fair 
at the time the transaction was approved; they need not prove that the transaction ultimately turned out positively for 
the corporation.  See Emerald Partners, 2003 WL 21003437, at *38 (holding that the merger was fair to the 
shareholders on the date it was consummated).
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witnesses.118  In such circumstances, courts must examine “assets, market value, earnings, future 
prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a company’s 
stock.”119  Whether an employee’s compensation can be appropriately appraised along the same 
lines is a question that Delaware Supreme Court has yet to answer.
The second prong of the entire fairness test requires the defendant to prove that the 
transaction was the product of fair dealing.120  This inquiry “embraces questions of when the 
transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and 
how the approvals of directors…were obtained.”121
Finally, defendants who benefit from an exculpatory provision may argue that even if the 
transaction were unfair, it was merely the product of a lapse of care and therefore cannot give 
rise to director liability.122  An exculpation provision permitted by Section 102(b)(7) acts as an 
affirmative defense.123  Thus, if a defendant's breach of fiduciary duty is found to have caused 
the corporation to engage in an unfair transaction, then the burden of proof shifts to the 
defendant, who must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the breach was "exclusively 
attributable to a violation of the duty of care.”124  Directors who fail to surmount this burden will 
be personally liable for damages.  
118
 In such circumstances a fiduciary duty claim will often be consolidated with a shareholder appraisal under DEL. 
CODE ANN., tit. 8, Section 262 (2001).  See, e.g., In re Emerging Communications, Inc. S’Holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 
16415, 2004 WL 1305745 (Del. Ch. June 4, 2004).
119 Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 See, e.g., Emerging Communications, 2004 WL 1305745, at *38; see also Barney Gimbel, Why We’ll Miss the 
Disney Trial, FORTUNE, Dec. 27, 2004, at 34 (“Incompetence pays.”).
123 Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1223 (Del. 1999).  
124 Emerging Communications, 2004 WL 1305745, at *40 (quoting Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 98 
(Del. 2001)).  Delaware differs substantially from other jurisdictions in assigning the burden of proof in fiduciary 
duty actions.  See, e.g., OH. REV’D CODE ANN. §1701.59(D) (1999) (“A director shall be liable in damages for any 
action that the director takes or fails to take as a director only if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence in a 
court of competent jurisdiction that the director's action or failure to act involved an act or omission undertaken with 
deliberate intent to cause injury to the corporation or undertaken with reckless disregard for the best interests of the
corporation.”) (emphasis added).  
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One question left unresolved by Emerald Partners is which side bears the burden of 
production when directors defend themselves on the ground that their actions were exclusively 
attributable to a lack of due care.  One possibility is that defendants will be forced to produce 
evidence of their their loyalty and good faith once they are found to have breached any fiduciary 
duty.  Alternatively, plaintiffs might need to prove a prima facie case of disloyalty or bad faith 
before the defendants can be obligated to prove that the breach of fiduciary duty was exclusively 
a product of insufficient care.  Usually the party bearing the burden of persuasion will also bear 
the burden of producing evidence in her favor.125  Therefore, defendants generally bear the 
burden of producing evidence to support an affirmative defense.126
However, in Emerging Communications Justice Jacobs placed the burden of production 
on the plaintiffs.127  The court found that seven directors had breached their fiduciary duties to 
minority shareholders by approving a grossly unfair telecommunications merger in which the 
target corporation stood on opposite sides of the table from its Chairman and CEO, Jeffrey J. 
Prosser.128  Nevertheless, the court found that four of them were shielded from liability by the 
company’s exculpation provision because the plaintiffs had failed to present a prima facie case 
of bad faith or disloyalty that th[o]se directors would be called upon to negate or disprove.”129  In 
other words, a breach of fiduciary duty will not automatically create a presumption of bad faith 
or disloyalty that the defendant will need to disprove.  Rather, the court will presume that the 
125
 Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, FEDERAL EVIDENCE §65 (2d ed. 2004).
126 See id.
127 Emerging Communications, 2004 WL 1305745, at *42.  The Justice was sitting on the Court of Chancery by 
designation.  Id. at n.*.  The bifurcation of evidentiary burdens in Emerging Communications is indicative of Justice 
Jacobs’ clearly-stated opposition to treating a Section 102(b)(7) provision as an affirmative defense.  See Critique of 
Van Gorkom, supra note 17, at 463 -64 (describing Emerald Partners I as an “unfortunate” development that 
“dysfunctionally undercuts the purpose of section 102(b)(7)” and “perpetuates costly litigation without creating any 
countervailing social utility”).  
128 Emerging Communications, 2004 WL 1305745, at *1, *41-43.  In a consolidated appraisal action arising from 
the same transaction, the court valued the company at nearly four times the price paid to the cashed out shareholders.  
Id. at *43.  
129 Id. at *42. 
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breach was exclusively the product of a lack of due care until the plaintiffs produce evidence to 
the contrary.130
Plaintiffs need not present direct evidence of the defendant’s intent in order to meet the 
burden of production.131  Instead, a defendant’s expertise, actions, and general situation can serve 
as circumstantial evidence that the defendant either knowingly harmed the corporation or 
“consciously and intentionally disregarded [his or her] responsibilities.”132  But while plaintiffs 
can survive a motion to dismiss by pleading facts that raise an inference of bad faith,133 at trial 
the plaintiffs must prove that the corporate injury was caused by something more than gross 
negligence.  To determine what circumstantial evidence will be sufficient to meet this burden, 
courts will need to make context-specific inquiries into the facts of each case as they relate to 
each director.
For example, in Emerging Communications the court had little difficulty finding Prosser 
liable after concluding that, in order to “to force out ECM’s minority at an unfair price,” he had 
hidden the existence of internal financial projections that drastically increased ECM’s value.134
But defendant Salvatore Muoio presented a more difficult case, since he had no knowledge of the 
hidden projections and was not even a member ECM’s merger committee.135  Nevertheless, the 
court held Muoio liable because his extensive experience in finance and telecommunications put 
him in a position to know, or to at least have “strong reasons to believe,” that minority 
130 See id.
131 See id. at *40 (finding a director liable while admitting that no court could infallibly divine the operations of his 
mind).
132 Disney II, 825 A.2d at 289 (italics removed from original); see also Emerging Communications, 2004 WL 
1305745, at *42-43; Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health South Servs., Inc. v. Elkins, No. 
Civ.A. 20228-NC,  2004 WL 1949290, at *17 n.92 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2004) (“Rarely, if ever, will a plaintiff have 
direct evidence of a board’s intent.  Yet the Disney standard is scienter-based.  Thus, the Court will generally be 
required to look to the Board’s actions as circumstantial evidence of state of mind.”).  
133 See Discussion, supra notes 103-113 and accompanying text.
134 Emerging Communications, 2004 WL 1305745, at *42.  
135 Id. at *6-7.
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shareholders were being treated unfairly.”136  In other words, a person with Muoio’s abilities 
would probably not have voted for the merger unless he had been motivated by overt disloyalty 
or by a conscious and intentional disregard of his fiduciary duties.137  On the other hand, the 
court did not find defendant John G. Vondras to have been in a similar “position to know,” even 
though Vondras was a professional engineer, a member of the merger committee, and a 
telecommunications executive with over twenty-five years of industry experience.138
Emerging Communications illustrates the fact-dependant nature of inquiries into a 
director's loyalty and good faith.  Delaware judges will have substantial flexibility, as they 
always have, to apply principles of good faith and loyalty to specific situations as warranted by 
the circumstances.139
As of today, the Delaware Supreme Court has not yet reviewed Justice Jacobs’ 
determination that the burden of production falls on the plaintiff when a defendant relies on an 
exculpatory provision as a defense under Section 102(b)(7).  If the court does not adopt the 
holding of Emerging Communications, then grossly negligent directors will be forced to produce 
evidence proving that they were not unfaithful or disloyal.  If so, then corporate directors 
accused of fiduciary duty violations will find themselves in the uncomfortable position of 
claiming that they may have been fools, but were neither thieves, nor subversives, nor ostriches 
136 Id. at *39.  The holding here can be seen as a mirror-image of Judge Learned Hand’s often-cited refusal to hold 
an inexperienced director liable for his lack of expertise.  See Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) 
(“True, he was not very well-suited by experience for the job he had undertaken, but I cannot hold him on that 
account.  After all, it is the same corporation that chose him which now seeks to charge him.”).  In contrast, the 
Emerging Communications shareholders elected an expert to serve on the board, and therefore had a right to expect 
that his expertise would be employed for their benefit.  See Emerging Communications, 2004 WL 1305745, at *39.
137 Id. at *40 (quoting Disney II, 825 A.2d at 289).
138 Id. at *3, *42-43.  
139
 The fact-specific nature of this inquiry is typical of Delaware fiduciary law, which has long-relied on “principles-
based” decision-making.  New Federalism, supra note 23, at 979 (“Delaware law has resisted…the recitation (by 
statute or case law) of a detailed set of particular measures that boards must take, or of certain transactions that 
boards must avoid, if they are to act equitably and lawfully.”); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Exponential Tech., Inc., No. 
16315, 1999 WL 39547, at *7 n.31 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1999) (“This Court eschews inflexible rules that cannot 
discriminate good faith acts from disloyal conduct.”); Kamar, supra note 73, at 891 (“American corporate law is not 
an exact science.”).
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who intentionally kept their heads in the sand.140  Fact-finders are not likely to find such claims 
very credible, at least where Fortune 500 companies are concerned, because people usually do 
not get elected to the boards of large corporations by handling business affairs in a grossly 
negligent manner.141  But such defenses are not unheard of.  For example, in order to defend 
himself against a federal prosecution for criminal fraud, former WorldCom CEO Bernard Ebbers 
testified that “he was ignorant about accounting,” and had done “poorly in college, where his 
‘marks weren’t too good.’”142  In the end the jury did not find Ebbers’ self-professed naïveté to 
be very convincing.143
On the other hand, if the Supreme Court decides to place the burden of production on 
plaintiffs, the burden will be far from impossible to meet.144  Plaintiffs will generally prevail if 
they  can produce evidence that directors had plotted against the corporation’s interests or 
averted their eyes while others carried out a such a scheme.145  It would also be difficult to 
imagine a case where plaintiffs could not prevail after presenting evidence that defendants had 
either lied or hidden material information from shareholders.146
Furthermore, evidence of a director’s experience, abilities, or expertise may be used to 
rebut any claims of ignorance that the director may raise in his defense.147  Where a breach of 
fiduciary duty involves an incorrect valuation, a failure to disclose financial information, or other 
140
 Such arguments will prove to be particularly weak defenses for CEO’s who had previously garnered gigantic 
compensation packages by selling themselves as geniuses to investors.  See Kurt Eichenwald, When the Top Seat is 
the Hot Seat, N.Y. TIMES, March 16, 2005, at C1.  
141 Cf. Emerging Communications, 2004 WL 1305745, at *40 (finding that a director acted out of disloyalty rather 
than lack of care because he was an expert in both telecommunications and finance and therefore probably knew that 
the disputed merger was harmful to minority shareholders).  
142
 Ken Belson, Ebberts Mounts an “I Never Knew” Defense, N.Y. TIMES, March 1, 2005, at C1.
143
 Ken Belson, Ex-Chief of WorldCom is Found Guilty in $11 Billion Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, March 16, 2005, at A1 
(“Mr. Ebbers’ testimony that he did not know about the fraud, according to one juror, was unconvincing.”).  
144 See Emerging Communications, 2004 WL 1305745, at *39-40 (finding three directors liable for breaching their 
duties of loyalty and/or good faith).  
145 See id. at *39-41.  
146 See id. at *37 (noting that shareholders were materially misled by the corporation’s failure to disclose its most 
recent financial projections before the merger was approved).  
147 See, e.g., id. at *40.  
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accounting irregularities, federal law will make such rebuttals more credible by mandating the 
inclusion of financial experts on key board committees.  For example, under Sarbanes-Oxley, the 
audit committee of the board of every publicly-trade company is required have at least one 
financial expert.148  Directors who qualify as financial experts under federal law will be hard-
pressed to convince a Delaware court that their breach of fiduciary duty can best be explained as 
the product of their ignorance or gross negligence rather than bad faith or disloyalty.149
V. The Fallout From a More Vigorous Good Faith Standard.  
Recent developments in state corporate law have combined with federal regulation under 
Sarbanes-Oxley to create a more hospitable environment for shareholder plaintiffs who seek to 
make corporate fiduciaries pay for breaches of their duties.  Such a state of affairs will inevitable 
result in more claims being filed, many of which will survive a motion to dismiss.150  As 
plaintiffs’ attorneys make use of new legal developments to rack up their victories, the settlement 
148 See, e.g., Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 §407, 15 U.S.C. §7265; see also Instruction to paragraph (h)(1) of Item 
401 of Regulation S-K, (codified at 17 C.F.R. §229.401 (2004)) (allowing issuers to disclose the names of more than 
one financial expert).  
149
 Of course, Delaware courts are not required to adopt a federal definition of expertise.  But they will be eager to 
harmonize their standards with evolving federal norms in order “to avoid whipsawing corporate directors with 
incompatible dictates.”  New Federalism, supra note 23, at 987.  But see Regulation S-K Item 401(h)(4)(ii) (codified 
at 17 C.F.R. §229.401(h)(4)(ii)) (“The designation or identification of a person as an audit committee financial 
expert pursuant to this Item 401 does not impose on such person any duties, obligations or liability that are greater 
than the duties, obligations and liability imposed on such person as a member of the audit committee and board of 
directors in the absence of such designation or identification.”).  
      Also, the fact-bound nature of Delaware fiduciary duty law counsels against making any universally-applicable 
guidelines.  For example, if a breach of fiduciary duty involved a very specialized form of financial trickery, then 
perhaps directors who generally qualify as financial experts will be able to convince a court that their errors were 
caused by a combination of gross negligence and lack of expertise in that particular specialty, rather than by bad 
faith or disloyalty.
150
 The Delaware Court of Chancery will be called upon to separate the wheat from the chaff.  In fact, in a recent 
panel discussion on Managing the Liability Exposure of Directors, Vice Chancellor Strine expressed his dismay at 
the tendency of some plaintiffs’ attorneys to create a claim for bad faith out of just about any losing investment.  
Remarks at the Directors’ Education Institute, Duke University, Durham, N.C. (Mar. 18, 2005).
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value of both new and long-running cases will increase as corporate defendants scramble to 
avoid the prospect of trial and damages.151
Nevertheless, the growth in the number of settlements might be less than is generally 
expected, thanks to a few quirks of the laws of Delaware.  For example, under Delaware law the 
Court of Chancery must approve any settlements in shareholder class actions or derivative 
claims, a process which “involves a close judicial inspection of the proposed settlement on its 
merits.152  This process is somewhat handicapped by the fact that the court cannot rely on an 
adversarial process to weed out truthful information.153  However, the Delaware courts can be 
assisted in this process by active and engaged institutional investors, who can play a productive 
role policing both defendant directors and plaintiffs’ attorneys.154
In addition, negotiations between shareholders and directors will be complicated by the 
directors’ liability insurance provider, who usually will not be required to pay a settlement that it 
does not consent to.155  Most director and officer insurance (“D&O”) policies exclude coverage 
for wrongful conduct such as “intentionally dishonest acts or omissions, fraudulent acts or 
omissions, criminal acts or omissions, willful violations of any statute, rule, or law, illegal profit, 
or illegal remuneration.”156  However, if the D&O provider consents to a settlement before the 
court decides the merits of a case, then the insurer will be required to pay the full policy 
151 See Harold S. Bloomenthal, SETTLEMENTS AND THE PSLRA SEC. LAW HANDBOOK §30:21 (updated December 
2004) (“It cannot be gainsaid that a claim that survives a motion to dismiss has an enhanced settlement value….”).
152
 Kamar, supra note 73, at 898; see also Del. Ch. Ct. R. 23, 23.1 (2005).  
153 Cf. Angiolillo, supra note 77, at 305 (observing, in the context of federal class actions, that “it is no secret that in 
seeking court approval of their settlement proposal, plaintiffs’, attorneys’, and defendants’ interests coalesce and 
mutual interest may result in mutual indulgence.”) (quoting Kaplan v. Rand, 192 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 1999)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).
154 See Weiss supra note 92, at 1801 (describing how the involvement of objectors can alter the probability of a 
settlement being approved). 
155
 Christopher W. Martin, Director and Officer Insurance, 41 HOUSTON LAW. 38, 42 (2004).
156 Id. (capitalization and bullet-points removed).
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amount.157  Thus, the interests of all parties to the shareholder litigation may converge or diverge 
in unpredictable ways.
Plaintiffs, for example, will need to plead facts that indicate that defendants acted 
disloyally, in bad faith, or in some other manner that precludes exculpation under Section 
102(b)(7) in order to survive a motion to dismiss.158  However, once a motion to dismiss is 
denied, the shareholders may hesitate to take the case to trial, lest the court find that the alleged 
conduct was excludable under the defendant’s insurance policy.  Such a finding could leave the 
defendants judgment-proof.  On the other hand, plaintiffs who face particularly wealthy 
defendants may not be very concerned about the scope of the defendant’s insurance coverage.159
Furthermore, plaintiffs may insist that defendants pay some damages out of their own pockets in 
order to deter future misconduct.  The shareholders may also seek injunctive relief, such as 
reform of the firm’s corporate governance.160
Nor will defendants always have the same interests as their D&O providers.  On the day a 
suit is filed, both directors and insurers will want to see the complaint dismissed, since dismissal 
on the pleadings would eliminate the risk of liability with minimal litigation costs.  But as 
pointed out earlier, defendants cannot expect all complaints to be dismissed, especially in light of 
recent state and federal developments in corporate law.161  Once a motion to dismiss is denied, 
the interests of defendant and insurer may diverge.  
157 Id.
158 See Discussion, supra, Part IV.C.
159
 For the same reason, plaintiffs should be less eager to settle compensation suits, because the defendant will 
presumably be able to pay an adverse judgment with the allegedly improper compensation.  See, Disney II, 825 A.2d 
275, 279 (Del. Ch. 2003) (alleging that defendant Michael Ovitz was paid over $140 million); Official Committee of 
Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health Svcs., Inc. v. Elkins, No. Civ.A 20228-NC (Del. Ch., Aug. 24, 2004), 
2004 WL 1949290, at *1.
160 See Gibeaut, supra note 79, at 40-41.  Attorney Patrick S. McGurn of Institutional Shareholder Services labels 
such demands “good governance at gunpoint.”  Id.
161 See Discussion, supra Part IV.
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Defendants will usually be eager to settle for any amount lower than the value of the 
insurance policy.  Insurers, on the other hand, will be more willing to go to trial if they perceive 
the  proposed settlement to be more costly than litigation.  Thus, if the insurer suspects that its 
customer engaged in conduct that is excluded under the policy, it may prefer to litigate and lose 
on the merits so as to relieve itself of liability for damages.  Now that Delaware holds directors 
liable for breaches of the duty of good faith,162 D&O providers may modify their policies to 
explicitly deny coverage for bad faith conduct.  Insurers who do not already exclude bad faith 
might argue that a judicial finding of bad faith triggers exclusions for acts or omissions that are 
“[i]ntentionally dishonest” or that willfully violate a “statute, rule or law.”163
On the other hand, the insurer might agree to a settlement if it decides that legal or market 
forces compel it to accept a “reasonable” offer.164  Finally, the complications outlined above will 
multiply whenever the interests of officers and directors diverge from the interests of the 
corporation with whom they might share D&O coverage.165
Whether a particular case settles, and for how much, will depend on the interplay 
between the interests noted above,166 which game theorists might see as a dynamic game with 
imperfect information.167  Plaintiffs’ attorneys would probably call the situation a gamble, while 
defense lawyers might prefer the term “billing opportunity.”  To the parties themselves, it is a 
mess.  The upshot of these barriers to settlement will be that many fiduciary duty litigants will be 
unable to avoid trial.
162 See Disney II, 825 A.2d 275, 278 (Del. Ch. 2003).
163 See Martin, supra note 155, at 42.
164 See id. (recommending that directors decline to purchase insurance policies that permit the insurer to 
unreasonably withhold consent to a settlement).
165 See id. at 44-45.
166
 Of course, the underlying facts of the case will also be relevant.
167 Cf. Ian Ayres, Playing Games with the Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1291, 1294-97 (describing how civil litigation 
settlement strategies can be modeled using game theory) reviewing Eric Rasmusen, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989).
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But although the short-term result of recent corporate law developments will be more 
litigation, over time the perceived willingness of Delaware courts to find directors accountable 
may motivate them to improve the governance of their corporations in the hope of reducing their 
exposure to liability.168  For instance, directors could adopt corporate “best practice” policies that 
ensure that key decisions are made carefully, deliberately, and objectively.169  They also can be 
expected to better document their decision-making processes in order to deny plaintiffs’ 
attorneys the “particularized facts necessary to” remove the protections of the business judgment 
rule.170  For example, directors who hope to avoid the fate of the defendants in Disney II might 
seek to create better records of the processes they use to approve executive compensation 
packages.171  It remains to be seen if such documentation will be effective in dismissing claims 
that seek to hold directors responsible for allegedly bad faith actions or omissions.  
168
 Any improvements in corporate governance will also be attributable to increased shareholder activism, see Levitt, 
supra note 70 at A16, and to federal and SRO regulations that have essentially codified what were once aspirational 
corporate governance norms.  See New Federalism, supra note 23, at 957.  
169
 Delaware judges have on multiple occasions encouraged directors to adopt “best practices” of corporate 
governance, although they generally mention that such practices are not required to fulfill one’s fiduciary duties to 
the corporation.  See, e.g., Veasey, supra note 24, at 1450, 1456-57 (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 
(Del. 2000)). 
170 See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 249.
171 Cf., 825 A.2d 275, 278 (Del. Ch. 2003) (noting that the “complaint suggests that the Disney directors failed to 
exercise any business judgment and failed to make any good faith attempt to fulfill their fiduciary duties…”) 
(emphasis in original).
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CONCLUSION
Recent developments in state and federal law have given an advantage to plaintiffs at 
nearly every stage of a fiduciary duty suit.  The whistle-blower protection provisions of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act have forced corporations to create a paper trail of misdeeds that plaintiffs' 
attorneys can then access by way of a books and records search under Section 220.172  These 
records might then form the basis of a complaint that can survive a motion to dismiss by stating 
facts with particularity that give rise to an inference that the director defendants acted disloyally 
or in bad faith.  In fact, most complaints that merely allege gross negligence will survive a 
motion to dismiss, because any deed or omission amounting to gross negligence will, by its very 
wantonness, raise an inference that the conduct was either intentional or reflected a conscious 
disregard for the corporation’s welfare.  
If the complaint survives a motion to dismiss and the case goes to trial, plaintiffs will 
then need to prove that the defendants breached a fiduciary duty.  If they succeed, the defendants 
will have the burden of proving that the disputed transaction was entirely fair to the corporation.  
Alternatively, the defense may seek to escape liability by convincing the court that the 
breach of fiduciary duty was entirely the result of a lack of due care.  Delaware law is uncertain 
regarding which side has the burden of producing evidence at this point in the litigation.  If the 
court imposes the burden of producing evidence of non-exculpable conduct on the plaintiffs, then 
defendants may succeed in convincing the court that plaintiffs failed to state a prima facie case 
of bad faith or disloyalty.  However, if the burden of production remains on defendants, then the 
directors will face the daunting and unpleasant task of convincing a court that they may have 
172 See Beam v. Martha Stewart Omnimedia, Inc. 833 A.2d 961, 982 n.67 (2003) (noting, according to counsel for 
the plaintiffs, that filing requests for books and records has become “a standard practice”) 
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been grossly negligent, but were nevertheless motivated by only the purest desire to promote the 
interests of shareholders.  
Some commentators have assured directors that the vast majority of them need not worry 
about personal liability for breaches of fiduciary duties.173   These commentators are correct 
insofar as that relatively few directors will act with the requisite gross negligence that constitutes 
lack of due care.  But directors are concerned about more than liability—they and their insurers 
prefer to stay out of the courtroom entirely.  Given the weakness of Section 102(b)(7) as a means 
of winning a motion to dismiss, directors who act without due care should not expect to be able 
to avoid either settlement or trial.  
Of course, the Delaware plaintiffs’ bar is not blind to these developments, and can be 
expected to aggressively employ whatever new tools the law has provided.  As a result, corporate 
boards should expect shareholder plaintiffs to increasingly win favorable settlements and 
judgments in fiduciary duty actions.  
173 E.g., Veasey, supra note 24, at 1458 (quoting Remarks of Vice Chancellor Strine, in Thomas A. Roberts, et. al., 
Director Liability Warnings from Delaware, BUS. & SEC. LITIGATOR, Feb. 2003, at 12); Jaclyn J. Janssen, Note, In 
Re Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation: Why Stockholders Should not Put too Much Faith in the Duty of 
Good Faith to Enhance Director Accountability, 2004 WISC. L. REV. 1573 (2004).
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APPENDIX
DEL. CODE. ANN., tit. 8, §102(b)(7) (2001):
(b) …[T]he certificate of incorporation may…contain any or all of the following matters:
… (7) A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the 
corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a 
director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a 
director: (i) For any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its 
stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional 
misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) under § 174 of this title; or (iv) for any 
transaction from which the director derived an improper personal benefit. No such 
provision shall eliminate or limit the liability of a director for any act or omission 
occurring prior to the date when such provision becomes effective. All references in this 
paragraph to a director shall also be deemed to refer (x) to a member of the governing 
body of a corporation which is not authorized to issue capital stock, and (y) to such other 
person or persons, if any, who, pursuant to a provision of the certificate of incorporation 
in accordance with §141(a) of this title, exercise or perform any of the powers or duties 
otherwise conferred or imposed upon the board of directors by this title.
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